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A number of papers have posited that there is a relationship between institutional structure and pro-
social behaviour, in particular donated labour, in the delivery of public services, such as health, social 
care and education. However, there has been very little empirical research that attempts to measure 
whether such a relationship exists in practice. This is the aim of this paper. Including a robust set of 
individual and job-specific controls, we find that individuals in the non-profit sector are significantly 
more likely to donate their labour, measured by unpaid overtime, than those in the for-profit sector. We 
can  reject  that  this  difference  is  simply  due  to  implicit  contracts  or  social  norms.  We  find  some 
evidence that individuals differentially select into the non-profit and for-profit sectors according to 
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1. Introduction 
The  idea  that  there  is  a  relationship  between  institutional  structure  and  pro-social 
behaviour  has  been  prevalent  for  many  years,  notably  in  the  work  of  Hansmann 
(1980) and Rose-Ackerman (1996), and has recently been re-visited by Benabou and 
Tirole  (2006),  Besley  and  Ghatak  (2005),  Glaeser  and  Shleifer  (2001),  Francois 
(2000,  2001,  2003,  2007),  and  Prendergast  (2007).
1  A  key  prediction  from  this 
literature is that there will be a positive relationship between employment in the non-
profit sector
2 and pro-social behaviour, and donated labour in particular. By donated 
labour  is  meant  any  additional  effort  beyond  what  is  contractually  necessary  and 
excluding that motivated by career concerns (Dewatripont et al., 1999).  
A  simple  example  illustrates  how  this  relationship  may  arise.  Consider  a  small 
hospital  where  the  employees  care  not  only  about  their  current  and  future 
remuneration but also about the quality of their patients’ care. As a result, they agree 
not to leave their shift if, because of a random event, there is nobody else to take over. 
In a world of incomplete contracts for-profit employers will find it hard to pre-commit 
not to take advantage of this decision by hiring fewer employees than they otherwise 
would. For example, since they are now less likely to be sued for negligence than 
before (the employees have ensured that there will always be cover available) they 
can  reduce  their  staff  numbers.  The  net  effect  is  that  some,  possibly  all,  of  the 
proposed  donated  labour  is  expropriated  to  increase  profit.  Since  ex  ante  the 
employees realise this, they will decide not to donate their labour in the first place 
because it will not improve the quality of patient care. Hence, incentives to donate 
labour will not be present or will be muted in for-profit firms. By contrast, in a not-
for-profit organisation the non-distribution constraint prevents this expropriation from 
occurring  and  any  donated  labour  will  have  a  direct  effect  on  patient  care.  In  a 
                                                 
1 We define pro-social behaviour as helpful behaviour intended to benefit other people unmotivated by 
professional obligations, see Bierrhof (2002). We draw a standard distinction between actions that 
agents may take as a consequence of their other-regarding preferences and the characteristics of the 
preferences. We use the terms other-regarding, pro-social motivation, and public service motivation to 
refer to characteristics of agents’ preferences (see, for example, Francois and Vlassopoulos, 2008), 
whereas pro-social behaviour and donated labour describe actions that agents take. Donated labour is 
essentially pro-social behaviour in the specific labour market context. 
2 We use “non-profit sector” to refer to any organisation that is not profit-making, which includes both 
not-for-profit organisations, as well as government organisations.   3 
government organisation, the fact that budgets are set bureaucratically has a similar 
effect.  
In  this  simple  illustration  all  employees  are  pro-socially  motivated  but  will  only 
donate their labour in a non-profit organisation not in a for-profit organisation. We 
refer  to  this  as  the  ‘organisational-form’  explanation  and  it  is  the  essence  of  the 
mechanism suggested by Francois (2000). Another approach suggests that ‘mission-
oriented’  individuals  (those  who  are  pro-socially  motivated)  will  be  attracted  to 
organisations with a similar mission (Besley and Ghatak, 2003, 2005). Making the 
additional  assumption  that  non-profit  organisations  are  associated  with  pro-social 
missions, individuals who wish to donate labour are more likely to be matched with 
non-profit rather than for-profit organisations.  
In contrast to the growing theoretical literature there has been very little empirical 
economic research on pro-social behaviour and none that provides very firm evidence 
on the relationship with institutional structure. There are a number of surveys that find 
evidence of differences in individuals’ self-reported motivations across sectors and a 
greater prevalence of intrinsic motivations in the non-profit sector.
3 However, these 
may reflect a halo effect as much as genuine differences. Frank and Lewis (2004) 
look  at  differences  in  self-reported  effort  by  sector  and  find  evidence  of  greater 
reported effort in the public sector. But again the measure is highly subjective. They 
also do not have information on individuals’ actual sector of employment, relying 
instead on constructed estimates based on industry.  
The aim of this paper is to provide evidence on whether pro-social behaviour, i.e. 
donated labour, varies by sector. We use unpaid overtime as our measure of donated 
labour; compared to self-reported motivations or levels of effort, we would argue that 
hours of unpaid overtime are more directly comparable across all employees and less 
subject to problems of reporting bias by sector. We investigate whether employees 
provide more unpaid overtime in the delivery of public services if the services are 
provided by the non-profit sector rather than by the for-profit sector. We also begin to 
explore the mechanism by which any such relationship may arise.  
                                                 
3 Le Grand (2003), chapter 2 provides a summary of a number of these studies. See also Marsden and 
French (1998).   4 
We use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). As discussed further 
in section 3, the BHPS is well-suited for examining the relationship between donated 
labour and institutional form for a number of reasons. Unlike many other datasets, it 
has information on the two key variables – sector of employment (non-profit and for-
profit) and hours of unpaid overtime. Also, as a panel, it enables us to follow the same 
individuals  switching  between  sectors  and  observe  any  change  in  their  pro-social 
behaviour. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses the main models in the 
literature and our empirical strategy, while section 3 contains further details on the 
data and definitions of key variables. In section 4 we show that there is indeed a 
positive and significant correlation between sector and donated labour, controlling for 
a wide range of individual- and job-specific characteristics. Of course, this difference 
may simply be explained by implicit contracts or social norms operating within each 
of the sectors. In section 5 we exploit the panel nature of our data to estimate a simple 
fixed effects model. We show that there is no evidence that individuals change their 
donated  labour  when  they  switch  sector  and  thus  we  reject  these  alternative 
explanations.  This  finding  also  causes  us  to  reject  a  strong  organisational-form 
explanation, suggesting that the observed relationship is more likely to be explained 
by a process of mission-matching or selection into different sectors. In section 6 we 
present evidence consistent with this explanation. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Background and empirical approach 
The literature identifies two related, but formally distinct, mechanisms that may give 
rise to a relationship between institutional form and donated labour. The first, which 
we  call  the  ‘organisational-form’  approach  is  expressed  most  clearly  by  Francois 
(2000). In this model, individuals working in caring industries, including for example, 
health,  education  and  social  care,  exhibit  pro-social  motivation  in  that  they  care 
directly about the quality of the output.
4 But the extent to which they will engage in 
                                                 
4 Here we are sidestepping the distinction between individuals who care only about the overall value of 
the public service to which they contribute (pure or output-oriented altruism), individuals who receive a 
warm glow from their participation (impure or action-oriented altruism), or those that value both. See 
Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) for a detailed discussion of this distinction.    5 
pro-social behaviour, in this case donate their labour, depends on the organisational 
form.  As  in  the  hospital  example  above,  if  there  is  a  residual  claimant  who  can 
expropriate  any  labour  that  is  donated,  as  in  a  for-profit  organisation,  then  the 
incentive to donate labour is muted since the extra effort does not benefit the intended 
recipients.  In  the  case  of  not-for-profit  organisations  there  are  a  number  of 
mechanisms  that  work  to  prevent  this  expropriation  from  occurring:  the  non-
distribution constraint means that any ‘profits’ and income are only to be applied to 
the firm’s objectives, dividend payments are prohibited and an asset lock-in means 
that,  on  winding-up,  all  assets  must  be  transferred  to  another  body  with  similar 
objectives.  Thus  in  a  not-for-profit  organisation  pro-socially  motivated  employees 
will be willing to provide extra effort because it will improve the quality of output. A 
somewhat related argument applies to government agencies who will not expropriate 
donated labour because decisions are made bureaucratically rather than to maximise 
profit. The organisational-form model predicts that there is likely to more donated 
labour in non-profit organisations than for-profit organisations. A further implication 
is that a change in the institutional form (between for-profit and non-profit) is likely to 
affect the extent to which individuals donate their labour.  
An alternative mechanism, which we call the ‘mission-matching’ approach, has been 
most  clearly  formalised  by  Besley  and  Ghatak  (2005).  In  this  model  individuals 
exhibit particular missions which motivate them to engage in pro-social behaviour. 
While the mission – and the associated behaviour – is a fixed individual characteristic, 
people will be attracted to organisations that share their mission, so that mission-
oriented organisations that favour high quality public service provision will attract 
employees whose personal mission matches this. The core distinction in the model is 
between  mission-oriented  and  profit-oriented  organisations.  However,  while  the 
theory is based on this distinction, rather than the for-profit/non-profit  distinction, 
mission oriented organisations are typically aligned with not-for-profit organisations 
and  public  bureaucracies  so  the  results  are  deemed  to  be  informative  about  the 
differences between for-profit and non-profit organisations. As Besley and Ghatak 
(2003) put it, “if a nurse believes that nursing is an important social service with 
external benefits, then it should not matter whether he or she is employed by the 
public or private sector, except in so far as this affects the amount of benefit that he or 
she can generate.” Because of the assumption that non-profit organisations are more   6 
likely  to  be  mission-oriented,  the  mission-matching  model  also  predicts  that  there 
should  be  more  donated  labour  in  non-profit  organisations  than  for-profit 
organisations.  However,  the  emphasis  is  on  the  process  through  which  mission-
oriented individuals are attracted to work in the non-profit sector.  
Our primary aim is to test the central prediction of both these models, which is that 
there is a positive association between non-profit organisations and donated labour. 
We  use  unpaid  overtime  as  our  measure  of  donated  labour.  Since  actual  work 
intensity is not easily observable, we would argue that unpaid overtime is a good 
proxy since it captures the hours worked over and above the contractual requirement 
for  which  the  individual  does  not  receive  any  direct  financial  compensation.  Of 
course,  individuals  may  do  unpaid  overtime  in  the  expectation  of  receiving 
compensation in the form of higher wages in the future (career concerns) and we 
discuss in section 3 how we control for this.  
We estimate the probability that an individual does any unpaid overtime using a linear 
probability  model.  We  show  below  that  the  greatest  variation  is  in  this  extensive 
margin. We include four binary indicators representing the non-profit and for-profit 
“caring”  sectors  and  the  non-profit  and  for-profit  “non-caring”  sectors  (defined  in 
section 3 below). Our main interest is in the difference between the two caring sectors 
since that is where pro-social behaviour is likely to matter, but we include the non-
caring sectors since they may reveal interesting more general differences between the 
caring and non-caring sectors and between the for-profit and non-profit sectors. We 
include controls for both individual characteristics and job characteristics, including a 
number of variables to control for the extent to which unpaid overtime is motivated by 
career concerns. Initially we treat the data simply as pooled cross-sections and do not 
take the panel data structure into account explicitly.  
As shown in section 4, we find strong evidence of a non-profit premium. Individuals 
in the non-profit sector are 12 percentage points (or more than 40 per cent) more 
likely to do unpaid overtime than individuals in the for-profit sector. Of course, a 
simple difference in unpaid overtime between people working in the two sectors is not 
necessarily evidence of pro-social behaviour in the non-profit sector. It may simply 
reflect differences in implicit contracts over hours of work between non-profit and 
for-profit caring sectors, or that individuals abide by different social norms in the two 
sectors.    7 
To rule out these alternative explanations, we exploit the panel nature of the data and 
look  at  what  happens  when  individuals  switch  sectors.  If  the  non-profit  premium 
reflected either implicit contracts or social norms, we would expect to see individuals 
changing their donated labour when they switch between the non-profit and for-profit 
caring sectors in order to abide by the implicit contract/ social norm in their new 
sector. We therefore also estimate a fixed effects regression where the standard error 
term is decomposed into a constant individual specific effect and a pure random error 
term:  it i it u v h = + . In the fixed effects specification, the sector effects are identified 
only from individuals who change sector. As shown in section 5, we find no evidence 
that individuals change their behaviour when they switch sector, which we take as 
strong evidence that differences between sectors are not simply attributable to implicit 
contracts or social norms. This finding is also inconsistent with a strong form of the 
organisational form model where a change in sector is likely to be associated with a 
change in behaviour. 
Instead, we would argue that the estimated non-profit premium is likely to reflect the 
selection  of  individuals  into  different  sectors  on  the  basis  of  their  pro-social 
motivation. Put simply, “caring” individuals appear to select themselves into the non-
profit  sector  and  “non-caring”  individuals  into  the  for-profit  sector.  Formally,  the 
selection story is that  ( ) | 0 i it E sector s h = ¹ . In section 6, we present evidence that 
supports this selection story. We show that individuals who switch from the non-
profit caring sector to the for-profit caring sector are less likely to do unpaid overtime 
(when they are in the non-profit sector) than those who stay in the non-profit caring 
sector. This difference is statistically significant. We also find that individuals who 
switch from the for-profit caring sector to the non-profit caring sector are more likely 
to do unpaid overtime when they are in the for-profit sector than those who stay in the 
for-profit sector.  
 
3. Data 
The data we use are taken from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Since 
1991 this survey has annually interviewed members of a representative sample of 
around  5,500  households,  covering  more  than  10,000  individuals.  On-going 
representativeness  of  the  non-immigrant  population  is  maintained  by  using  a   8 
“following  rule”  –  i.e.  by  following  original  sample  members  (adult  and  children 
members  of  households  interviewed  in  the  first  wave)  if  they  move  out  of  the 
household or if their original household breaks up.
5 
A key advantage of using the BHPS is that as a panel it allows us to observe the same 
people working in both the for-profit and non-profit sectors. It also collects a wide 
range of detailed demographic and employment information. A potentially limiting 
factor is that the sample sizes in each wave of the BHPS are not sufficiently large to 
allow us to estimate standard deviations of wages by occupation with any precision. 
We use these to control for career concerns as discussed further below. We therefore 
supplement our analysis with data from the Labour Force Survey, a quarterly sample 
of 60,000 individuals. This limits our analysis to the period 1993 – 2000 for which we 
have common information across both datasets.  
 We select a sub-sample of individuals aged 16 – 60 who work between 30 hours and 
90 hours per week. We exclude the self-employed and individuals in industries with 
non-standard working practices such as the armed forces, forestry and agriculture. We 
drop observations with missing information in key variables and also trim the top and 
bottom 0.5 per cent of the distributions of key variables such as hours of overtime 
(paid and unpaid), usual job hours and hourly pay.
6 Our final BHPS sample contains 
6,061 individuals (24,135 person observations). 
The BHPS does not directly ask individuals how many hours unpaid overtime they 
work. Instead, they are asked the following three questions about their hours of work: 
·  Thinking  about  your  (main)  job,  how  many  hours  excluding  overtime  and 
meal breaks are you expected to work in a normal week? 
·  And how many hours overtime do you usually work in a normal week? 
·  How much of that overtime (usually worked) is usually paid overtime? 
 
                                                 
5 The survey incorporated booster samples from Scotland and Wales in 1999 and Northern Ireland in 
2001 but we restrict our sample to original sample members.  
6  We  also  follow  the  practice  used  in  deriving  government  statistics  from  LFS  data  of  excluding 
individuals with weekly earning in excess of £3500, and £1000 for manual workers.   9 
The answer to the first question is assumed to reflect an individual’s basic, contracted 
hours. The second two questions are used to derive the number of hours of unpaid 
overtime. Although calculated as a residual, estimates of unpaid overtime using the 
BHPS compare well to those obtained using the LFS where individuals are asked 
directly how much unpaid overtime they do.
7 
The  main  focus  of  our  analysis  is  a  comparison  of  unpaid  overtime  worked  by 
individuals  in  different  sectors  (for-profit  and  non-profit).  We  define  individuals’ 
sector on the basis of the following question: 
·  Which of the types of organisations on this card do you work for (in your main 
job)? 
 
Individuals are prompted with a list of options. Those who respond “private firm/ 
company” are allocated to the for-profit sector. All other responses are allocated to the 
non-profit  sector.  These  include  “civil  servant/central  government”,  “local 
government/town hall”, “NHS or higher education”, “nationalised industry”, “non-
profit organisation”.
8 Our non-profit sector therefore includes individuals working in 
the public sector, as well as in (traditionally defined) non-governmental not-for-profit 
organisations.  
A potential problem with this self-reported measure is that it may be subject to non-
random measurement error. Estimates of the public sector workforce based on a self-
reported measure in the LFS have been shown to overestimate the size of the public 
sector workforce. However, this bias has been shown to be mainly attributable to 
(self-employed)  general  medical  practitioners  wrongly  classifying  themselves  as 
public sector and to staff in higher education classifying themselves as public sector, 
as opposed to the not-for-profit sector.
9 Since we drop the self-employed from our 
sample  and  since  we  are  interested  in  the  distinction  between  the  for-profit  and 
(widely-defined) non-profit rather than between the public and not-for-profit sectors, 
                                                 
7 We estimate that 27% of individuals supply unpaid overtime in the BHPS compared with 29% in the 
LFS. 
8 The two other categories – armed forces and other – are dropped from our analysis. 
9 Millard and Machin (2007).   10 
we would argue that these measurement error issues do not pose a problem for our 
analysis.  
Our analysis of donated labour focuses on individuals working in caring industries 
since this is where we would expect individuals’ motivation to be manifested in extra 
donated labour. There is no formal definition of caring industries. To avoid imposing 
our own, possibly arbitrary, definition we follow Francois (2003) in identifying caring 
industries as those with a “…a public good component. Examples of such services are 
childcare,  medical  care,  education,  and  care  for  the  aged”.  We  therefore  define 
individuals working in health, education and social care industries as being in caring 
industries using the 1980 Standard  Industrial Classification (SIC) two digit codes. 
Individuals working in these industries comprise 17 per cent of our total sample.  
It could be argued that an industry-wide definition of caring is too broad; for example 
a hospital cleaner may not donate their labour because they work in a hospital rather 
than in an office, whereas hospital doctors may posses a greater level of attachment to 
the service they provide. For this reason, we also used a more restricted definition that 
cross-classifies industry with job occupation and defines caring occupations within 
caring  industries,  to  include  managers,  natural  scientists,  health  and  teaching 
professionals and childcare workers. This definition restricts individuals working in 
caring to 14 per cent of our sample. A third possible definition of caring includes 
research  and  development,  the  arts  and  culture,  corresponding  to  a  broader  set  of 
industries  where  not-for-profit  organisations  are  concentrated  according  to  Rose-
Ackerman (1996). This broadens the group of caring individuals to 20 per cent of our 
sample. We have assessed that our main conclusions are not sensitive to the definition 
of caring that we use and in the rest of the analysis presented below we focus on the 
first definition. 
 Table  1  summarises  the  distribution  of  caring  services  across  sectors  and  across 
individual industries. Caring services are concentrated in the non-profit sector, with 
only 15 per cent of individuals employed in caring industries working in the for-profit 
sector. The breakdown is similar across the three industries (health, education and   11 




Table 1. Distribution by sector 
  Full sample  Percentage  Health  Education  Social care 
Non-profit caring  3573  14.80  1179  1617  777 
For-profit caring  651  2.70  294  208  149 
Non-profit non-caring  3219  13.34       
For-profit non-caring  16692  69.16       
Total  24135  100  1473  1825  926 
Non-profit refers to not-for-profit organisations and public organisations; For-profit refers to private firms 
Caring refers to health, education and social care; Non-caring refers to all other industries  
 
 
Table 2 shows a clear distinction in the prevalence of donated labour between “for-
profit caring” and “non-profit caring”. 46 per cent of people working in “non-profit 
caring” do some unpaid overtime, compared to only 29 per cent in “for-profit caring”. 
There is a similar pattern in the intensive margin with individuals who work in “non-
profit  caring”  supplying  an  average  1.25  more  unpaid  overtime  hours  per  week 
compared to “for-profit caring”. The difference does not appear to be attributable to a 
general non-profit effect since the proportion doing unpaid overtime in non-caring 
industries does not vary significantly between the for-profit and non-profit sectors, 
while average hours are lower in non-profit non-caring than in for-profit non-caring. 
It is possible is that the additional unpaid overtime hours worked in the non-profit 
caring sector form part of an implicit contract and may compensate for shorter basic 
hours. Even if individuals are not formally contracted to work unpaid overtime, the 
expectation  to  do  it  may  be  sufficiently  strong  as  to  act  as  a  binding  constraint. 
Column (5) in Table 2 therefore compares the average number of hours of basic plus 
unpaid overtime worked by individuals in each of the sectors. Those in the non-profit 
caring work longer basic plus unpaid overtime hours than those in for-profit caring; 
the hours of unpaid overtime do not simply  reflect shorter basic hours. However, 
when  paid  overtime  is  included  in  column  (6),  the  difference  between  non-profit 
caring and for-profit caring disappears. Those in the non-profit caring sector are less 
                                                 
10 Most private schools are formally not-for-profit organisations and, as such, should not be included in 
the for-profit sector. However, this sector includes for-profit nurseries.   12 
likely to work paid overtime than those in all other sectors. Total hours (including 
unpaid and paid overtime) worked in the non-profit and for-profit caring sectors are 
the same, but the allocation between basic hours, unpaid overtime and paid overtime 
differs.
11 This may indicate an implicit contract to work overtime on an unpaid basis 
in the non-profit sector, and on a paid basis in the for-profit sector. However, another 
possibility  is  that,  outside  the  non-profit  caring  sector,  employers  cannot  rely  on 
unpaid overtime to make marginal adjustments in labour supply and must use formal 
paid overtime. We return to this issue in section 5.  
  
Table 2. Hours worked by sector 
  Unpaid overtime  Paid overtime  Total hours 
  (1) 
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Standard deviations in brackets 
Non-profit refers to not-for-profit organisations and public organisations; For-profit refers to private firms 
Caring refers to health, education and social care; Non-caring refers to all other industries 
* indicates that the difference with the non-profit caring sector is significant at 5% level 
 
 
4. Pooled estimation results 
The preliminary descriptive statistics show a distinction in unpaid overtime between 
individuals  in  the  for-profit  and  non-profit  caring  sectors.  However,  there  are  a 
number of other differences between the two sectors – in both the characteristics of 
the  jobs  and  the  individual  employees  –  that  may  account  for  this  difference.  As 
                                                 
11  In  principle,  we  could  look  explicitly  at  whether  individuals  are  remunerated  for  their  unpaid 
overtime by comparing average hourly pay across sectors, including hours of unpaid overtime in the 
denominator. However, as shown in Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007), differences between the sectors 
are not fully captured by current pay. Our alternative approach is to include measures capturing pay 
dynamics in our regression analysis.    13 
shown in Appendix A, individuals working in the non-profit sector are typically older, 
they are more likely to be female, they face different earnings profiles and risk of job 
loss. All of these factors may affect the likelihood of doing unpaid overtime and to 
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where  it D  is a binary indicator variable equal to one if individual i, i=1,…,N, does 
any unpaid overtime in time t, t=1,…,T, and zero otherwise. { } it sector s =  is a set of 
four binary indicators representing the non-profit and for-profit caring sectors and the 
non-profit  and  for-profit  non-caring  sectors.  The  vector  it x   contains  individual 
characteristics whereas  it z  is a vector of an individual’s job characteristics. Since the 
data show a clear distinction in whether individuals do any overtime, our main focus 
is on this extensive margin, although  we have  also run a Tobit regression on the 
number  of  hours  overtime.
12  We  estimate  a  linear  probability  model  for  ease  of 
interpretation of the results.
13  
The estimation results in Column I in Table 3 are not adjusted for individual and job 
characteristics and confirm the results of the previous section that there is a significant 
difference between the for-profit caring sector (the omitted sector) and the non-profit 
caring sector, equal to 17 percentage points. Individuals working in the non-profit 
non-caring sector are significantly less likely to do any unpaid overtime than those in 
the for-profit caring sector, while the difference between the for-profit caring and for-
profit non-caring sectors is not significant. 
Column  II  introduces  a  number  of  individual  characteristics  (means  and  standard 
deviations for all covariates are presented in Appendix A). These include standard 
controls  for  age,  gender,  ethnicity,  education,  marital  status  and  region.  We  also 
include controls for the presence and ages of children since they are likely to affect 
the opportunity cost of doing unpaid overtime. We allow the presence of children to 
differentially affect women. The inclusion of these individual characteristics reduces 
                                                 
12 The Tobit regression confirms the results of the linear probability model. Results are available on 
request.  
13 The results using a probit regression were similar.   14 
the size of the non-profit caring premium by 20 per cent, but it remains positive and 
significant.  
Column III adds a number of characteristics relating to the individual’s job. The first 
is a wage measure. A number of studies have drawn attention to the importance of 
unpaid overtime as an investment in future earnings (see Francesconi, 2001, Campbell 
and Green, 2002, Pannenberg, 2005). An individual’s current hourly wage is therefore 
likely  to  be  endogenous  since  it  will  reflect  unpaid  overtime  worked  in  the  past 
(which in turn may be correlated with current overtime) and we include, instead, the 
log of the median wage by occupation, year and age group (16-29, 30-45 and 46+) 
calculated using LFS data.
14 This wage variable may capture a number of things. First 
there is the potential opportunity cost – that the cost of doing unpaid overtime is 
greater at higher wages. In this case, however, the wage variable would be expected to 
attract a negative sign, rather than a positive one. The estimated positive coefficient 
may reflect an income effect – that at higher wages individuals can afford to do more 
unpaid  overtime.  More  likely,  however,  it  might  reflect  the  selection  of  career-
oriented individuals into high-paying occupations and/or the effect of high wages on 
unpaid overtime motivated by career concerns.  
As well as including a measure of average wage by occupation, we control for career 
concerns by including a measure of the variance of wages within an occupation to 
capture the future pay-off to unpaid overtime. This follows Bell and Freeman (2001) 
who argue that longer hours worked in the US compared to Germany can be attributed 
to greater wage inequality in the US, which in turn increases the financial rewards 
from  promotion  and  the  motivation  to  work  harder.  They  estimate  labour  supply 
equations at the occupation and individual level including the standard deviation of 
log hourly wages at the occupation level as a proxy for wage inequality and find this 
variable  to  be  positively  correlated  with  hours  worked.  We  therefore  include  the 
standard deviation of log hourly wages at the occupation level (calculated using data 
from the LFS) as our measure of career concerns. However, we refine the measure by 
calculating the standard deviation across the part of the age distribution that we think 
will  be  most  relevant  to  individuals  at  different  stages  of  their  career.  Thus  we 
calculate the standard deviation based on the entire age distribution for individuals 
                                                 
14 We use the standard occupational classification, with 90 occupations   15 
aged 16 – 30, the standard deviation over the age range 30 – 60 for individuals aged 
30 – 45, and the standard deviation over the age range 45 – 60 for individuals of this 
age. The standard deviations are therefore greater for younger workers, reflecting the 
fact that career concerns are likely to matter more for this age group. Our preferred 
career concerns variable (the standard deviation of log hourly wages by occupation, 
age group and year) enters positively and significantly in the regression. Additionally, 
we include controls for an individual’s tenure in their current job since they may be 
motivated to work harder early on to gain a good reputation to help secure future 
promotions.  
Calculating  the  standard  deviation  of  log  hourly  wages  at  the  occupation  level 
assumes  that  individuals  consider  the  distribution  of  wages  across  all  sectors  in 
making decisions about unpaid overtime, and will therefore consider career moves 
between sectors. However, if individuals consider careers within sector,
15 only the 
sector-specific standard deviation will matter in practice. Since the wage distribution 
is typically more compressed in the non-profit sector,
16 using sector-specific career 
concern measures will tend to reduce the effect of career concerns on unpaid overtime 
in the non-profit caring sector and increase the coefficient on the sector indicator. In 
practice,  however,  the  difference  between  the  results  of  the  two  different 
specifications is very small.  
We  include  two  additional  variables  to  capture  career  concerns.  We  include  an 
indicator  variable  (opportunity  for  promotion),  which  takes  the  value  one  if 
individuals say that they have opportunities for promotion in their current job. We 
also include an indicator variable if the individual’s pay includes a bonus since this 
type  of  performance-related  pay  may  induce  greater  effort.
17  Both  variables  enter 
positively and significantly as expected. We also try to take account of the fact that 
people may work harder to avoid being fired, as well as to gain promotion. The BHPS 
asks individuals about their level of satisfaction with job security in their current job  
                                                 
15 Or, alternatively, if the future rewards to unpaid overtime operate only within sectors. 
16 The averages of the log wage standard deviation measures are 0.45 in the for-profit sector and 0.40 in 
the non-profit sector. 
17 Specified examples include a Christmas or quarterly bonus, profit-related pay or profit-sharing or an 
occasional commission.   16 
Table 3. Results for the pooled linear probability model 
Dependent variable: whether individual does unpaid overtime (0/1)  
  Column I  Column II  Column III 
  Coeff  SE  Coeff  SE  Coef  SE 
For-profit caring (omitted)        -    -          -    -        -    - 
Non-profit caring  0.174  ***  0.032  0.139 ***  0.030  0.123 ***  0.027 
Non-profit noncaring  -0.062  **  0.031  -0.053   0.030  -0.148 ***  0.032 
For-profit noncaring  -0.045    0.029  0.003   0.027  -0.118 ***  0.030 
                 
Educ: No qualifications               -    -       -    - 
Educ: school level         0.108 ***  0.013  0.012   0.012 
Educ: college level         0.284 ***  0.014  0.090 ***  0.012 
Age         0.036 ***  0.003  0.008 ***  0.003 
Age squared         -0.045 ***  0.004  -0.012 ***  0.004 
Married         0.009   0.011  0.000   0.010 
Female         0.016   0.012  0.035 ***  0.010 
Children in household         -0.038 **  0.019  -0.034 **  0.016 
Female*children         -0.043 **  0.021  -0.022   0.018 
Youngest child aged 02         0.014   0.022  -0.010   0.019 
Youngest child aged 34         -0.030   0.022  -0.043 **  0.019 
Youngest child aged 511         -0.008   0.018  -0.014   0.015 
Youngest child aged 12+              -    -      -    - 
Non-white         -0.089 ***  0.027  -0.052 **  0.023 
                  
Ln wage, occ/age/year                0.326 ***  0.015 
SD Ln wage, occ/age/year                0.364 ***  0.048 
Job tenure                -0.008 ***  0.001 
Job tenure squared                0.018 ***  0.005 
Opportunity for promotion                0.032 ***  0.007 
Pay includes bonus                0.031 ***  0.007 
Job is secure                   -    - 
Job is not secure                -0.012   0.008 
Job neither secure/insecure                -0.012   0.009 
Individual is a manager                0.149 ***  0.009 
Small firm (<50)                0.032 ***  0.012 
Medium firm (50-499)                0.032 ***  0.010 
Large firm (500+)                    -    - 
Trade Union at workplace                -0.071 ***  0.011 
Indiv is member of union                -0.028 **  0.011 
Firm has pension scheme                0.010   0.011 
Indiv is member of pension                 0.055   0.011 
Usual hours<35                0.026   0.015 
Usual hours 35-40                0.037 ***  0.008 
Usual hours 40+                   -    - 
Health industry                -0.190 ***  0.026 
Social care industry                -0.117 ***  0.030 
                   
Observations  24135  24135  24135  
Number of Individuals  6016  6016  6016 
Adjusted R-squared  0.031  0.117  0.263  
Regressions include region and year dummies 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level 
*** indicates significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level   17 
and we include indicator variables for whether individuals are not satisfied that their 
job is secure, or are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied. The results show that, compared 
to being satisfied with job security, increasing insecurity is negatively correlated with 
doing unpaid overtime, suggesting that individuals put in effort when they think there 
is a chance of promotion, rather than to avoid being fired. 
Managers  typically  do  more  unpaid  overtime  because  of  the  more  complex  and 
nebulous nature of their tasks (Hart, 2004). Employees who underestimate task times 
must work unpaid overtime to fulfil contractual obligations. Also, managers are more 
likely to work unpaid overtime where their performance is judged by the performance 
of their team (see Bell and Hart, 1999). We therefore include an indicator for whether 
individuals report having managerial/supervisory duties at work. This is positive and 
significant.  
Finally,  we  include  a  number  of  controls  for  institutional  settings  that  may  affect 
unpaid overtime, including the presence of trade unions, employer pension schemes 
and the size of the firm. We also control for the basic number of hours an individual is 
expected to work since this may act as a constraint on their ability to do any unpaid 
overtime.
18  
Including these additional job characteristic variables reduces the size of the non-
profit caring unpaid overtime premium further, but it remains positive and significant. 
After allowing for a robust set of controls for career concerns and for other individual 
and job characteristics, we find that individuals in the non-profit caring sector are 
more than 12 percentage points (or more than 40 per cent) more likely to do unpaid 
overtime  than  individuals  working  in  the  for-profit  caring  sector.  Of  course,  this 
analysis does not enable us to explain why the difference arises, which is the focus of 
the analysis in the next section. 
In  Table  4  we  report  the  results  of  two  further  regressions  where  the  dependent 
variable  is  total  hours  worked  in  a  normal  week.  These  confirm  the  unadjusted 
findings from the previous section. Individuals in the non-profit caring sector work 
                                                 
18 We have also included a control for time spent travelling to work. This information is not available 
for all observations and we therefore exclude it from our main specification, but it does not affect the 
overall results in the subsample.   18 
significantly longer hours when total hours are defined as basic hours plus unpaid 
overtime. Thus, we can rule out the possibility that longer unpaid overtime hours are 
simply an adjustment for shorter basic hours. However, when paid overtime hours are 
included in the regression, there is no significant difference between the for-profit and 
non-profit caring sectors in total hours. What differs is the allocation of these total 
hours across basic hours, unpaid overtime and paid overtime. As already discussed, 
this different allocation may be attributable to institutional practices that vary across 
sectors. Or it may arise as a response to different levels of donated labour across the 
sectors. We explore these alternative explanations further in the next section.  
 
Table 4. Results for pooled OLS model  
Dependent variable: number of hours worked in a normal week 
  Column I 
Basic hours + unpaid OT 
Column II 
Basic hours + unpaid OT 
+ paid OT 
  Coeff  SE  Coeff  SE 
Non-profit caring  0.0231 **  0.0105  0.0003   0.0110 
Non-profit noncaring  -0.0633 ***  0.0123  -0.0632***  0.0132 
For-profit noncaring  -0.0451 ***  0.0117  -0.0235   0.0122 
Observations  24135  24135 
Adjusted R-squared  0.202  0.168 
Regressions include the full set of control variables 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level 
*** indicates significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level 
 
5. Fixed effects estimation results 
Our pooled regression results identify a significant difference in the probability of 
doing  unpaid  overtime  between  individuals  in  the  non-profit  and  for-profit  caring 
sectors. However, this is not necessarily evidence of pro-social behaviour.  It may 
instead reflect sector norms in the allocation of hours between basic hours and paid 
and unpaid overtime, or implicit contracts operating in the different sectors. If so, 
however,  we  would  expect  individuals  who  switch  sector  to  comply  with  the   19 
prevailing behaviour in their new sector, and therefore change behaviour when they 
switch. To investigate this, we estimate the following fixed effects regression where 




it s it it it i it
s
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The  error  term  in  equation  (1)  has  been  decomposed  into  a  constant  individual 
specific effect and a pure random effect:  it i it u v h = + . 
Information on our sample is summarized in Table 5, showing destination and origin 
sectors for individuals observed in consecutive periods. In all, nearly 6 per cent of 
observations involve a change in sector. Switches from the for-profit caring sector to 
the non-profit caring sector are relatively more common (as a proportion of all people 
working in the for-profit caring sector) than switches going the other way. 
 
Table 5. Switches across sectors 
  Sector, time t 
Sector, 










N-P caring  2404  83  135  50 
F-P caring  80  288  5  88 
N-P noncaring  129  9  2224  184 
F-P noncaring  88  85  133  12099 
 
Of course, switches are likely to be a non-random sample of all our observations and 
we discuss below how this is likely to affect our results. It might be thought that the 
ideal dataset for this analysis would capture an exogenous change in institution, e.g. a 
voluntary sector nursing home being taken over by the for-profit sector. However, 
even this case is likely to suffer from selection issues since the employees who remain 
working for the same institution after such a change are likely to be a selected group. 
Looking at the behaviour of switchers, while not ideal, is not obviously a lot worse 
than this kind of natural experiment.   20 
The results of our fixed effects regression are reported in Table 6. Many of the control 
variables – particularly the set of variables to capture career concerns – that were 
significant  in  the  pooled  regression  enter  significantly  in  the  fixed  effects 
specification, but the magnitude of the estimated effects is smaller. This suggests that 
individuals who are motivated by career concerns are likely to select themselves into 
jobs with opportunities for promotion, as well as promotion opportunities having an 
additional effect on unpaid overtime. 
We find that the non-profit caring sector effect is insignificant in the fixed effects 
regression. Of course, it might be that we have insufficient numbers of switchers to 
identify an effect. However, the fact that the estimated coefficient is very close to 
zero, rather than positive but imprecisely estimated is consistent with this being a 
genuine result.  
A zero finding could also be due to measurement error (misreporting or misrecording 
of  sector  status)  leading  to  spurious  sector  switches.  This  is  explored  further  in 
Appendix B where we show that our findings could be due to measurement error only 
with  a  very  high  proportion  of  misrecording.  We  believe  that  the  levels  of 
measurement error required to generate our findings are unlikely to occur in practice. 
To explore this, we have looked at how long individuals stay in their new sector 
following a switch. If observed “switches” were actually one-off measurement errors 
then  it  is  likely  that  individuals  would  revert  back  to  their  sector  of  origin  the 
following period. In fact, 75 per cent of switchers stay in their new sector for at least 
two  periods.  Also  if  a  very  high  proportion  of  observed  switches  were  actually 
measurement error then we would expect all the coefficients on the sector dummies to 
be close to zero, while we find that the estimated coefficient on non-profit non-caring 
is quite large.  
The  fact  that  the  estimated  non-profit  caring  sector  effect  is  close  to  zero  and 
insignificant in the fixed effects regression is a strong finding. It means, for example, 
that we can rule out the possibility that the difference in donated labour across sectors 
is simply due to a difference in allocation of total hours between basic hours, unpaid 
overtime and paid overtime across the sectors. If the difference in donated labour 
reflected this kind of sector norm then we would expect individuals to adopt that norm 
when they changed sector but this is not the case. This makes it more likely that the   21 
observed difference in paid overtime across the sectors is a response to the difference 
in donated labour rather than vice versa. 
 
Table 6. Estimation results for fixed effects linear probability model 
Dependent variable: whether individual does unpaid overtime (0/1) 
  Column I  Column II  Column III 
  Coeff  SE  Coeff  SE  Coef  SE 
For-profit caring (omitted)  -    -         -    -            -    - 
Non-profit caring  0.000    0.029  -0.001    0.028  0.002    0.028 
Non-profit noncaring  -0.042    0.030  -0.039    0.030  -0.061    0.042 
For-profit noncaring  -0.015    0.027  -0.015    0.027  -0.037    0.041 
                   
Age        0.011    0.011  0.001    0.011 
Age squared         -0.038  ***  0.006  -0.026  ***  0.006 
Married         0.002    0.012  0.002    0.012 
Children in household         -0.007    0.017  -0.009    0.017 
Female*children         -0.042  *  0.024  -0.035    0.023 
Youngest child aged 02         -0.005    0.018  -0.005    0.017 
Youngest child aged 34         -0.021    0.018  -0.022    0.018 
Youngest child aged 511         -0.001    0.014  0.001    0.014 
Youngest child aged 12+                 -    -         -    - 
                    
Ln wage, occ/age/year               0.092  ***  0.017 
SD Ln wage, occ/age/year               0.110  ***  0.040 
Job tenure              -0.004  ***  0.001 
Job tenure squared               0.015  ***  0.005 
Opportunity for promotion              0.015  **  0.006 
Pay includes bonus                0.012  **  0.006 
Job is secure                         -    - 
Job is not secure                -0.010    0.007 
Job neither secure/insecure                -0.006    0.008 
Individual is a manager                0.070  ***  0.008 
Small firm (<50)                0.009    0.012 
Medium firm (50-499)              0.016  *  0.009 
Large firm (500+)                -0.021  *  0.011 
Trade Union at workplace                        -    - 
Indiv is member of union                0.001    0.011 
Firm has pension scheme                0.000    0.012 
Indiv is member of pension                 0.025  **  0.011 
Usual hours<35              0.003    0.017 
Usual hours 35-40                0.054  ***  0.009 
Usual hours 40+                        -    - 
Health industry                -0.050    0.041 
Social care industry                -0.028    0.041 
                     
Observations  22703  22703  22703 
Number of Individuals  4619  4619  4619 
Regressions include region and year dummies 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level 
*** indicates significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level 
       
   22 
These fixed effects results also rule out a strong version of the organisational form 
model,  i.e.  a  common  institutional  effect  working  on  homogeneous  agents,  which 
would also imply individuals changing their behaviour when they switched sector. 
Instead,  the  results  are  consistent  with  the  selection  of  individuals  into  different 
sectors and in the next section we present some further evidence to support this.  
 
6. Evidence on selection 
In this section we look in more detail at the behaviour of people who switch sector 
(and compare it to that of the stayers) to find any evidence of selection into different 
sectors on the basis of propensity to donate labour. By directly comparing levels of 
unpaid overtime among the people who switch out of the sector with levels of unpaid 
overtime  among  the  stayers,  we  confirm  that  there  are  some  differences  between 
switchers and the other individuals in the sector they switch from. However, these 
differences are only significant for people switching from public to private, although 
this may reflect the sample sizes.  
We estimate the following models – one for people working in the non-profit caring 
(NPC) sector (model 3a) and the other for people working in the for-profit caring 
(FPC) sector (model 3b): 
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The aim is to see whether people who switch out of the sector at some point in the 
future are systematically different to people who stay in the sector since this would 
indicate a sorting of individuals across sectors. As before 
s
it D is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the individual does unpaid overtime when they are working in the non-
profit caring sector or in the for-profit caring sector. 
s
i Switch is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the individual switches out of the sector at any point in the future – into 
the for-profit sector for people working in the non-profit sector, or into the non-profit   23 
sector for those in the for-profit sector, or into (either the non-profit or for-profit) non-
caring sector for either sample. The coefficients on the switching indicators therefore 
pick up systematic differences in the propensity to donate labour between those who 
stay in a sector and those who switch out of the sector at some future point. Our prior 
is that people switching from the non-profit to the for-profit sector will be less likely 
to do unpaid overtime than the stayers ( 11 0 j < ) and that people switching from the 
for-profit sector to the non-profit sector will be more likely to do unpaid overtime 
than  the  stayers  ( 21 0 j > ).  We  would  expect  switchers  from  the  non-profit  caring 
sector to the non-caring sectors to look more like people in the non-caring sector than 
like people in the non-profit caring sector ( 12 0 j < ). We have no prior belief about 
how switchers from the for-profit caring sector to the non-caring sector might differ 
from the stayers.  
As  before,  we  include  a  wide  set  of  control  variables  for  individual  and  job 
characteristics.  The  results  are  presented  in  Table  7.  Note  that  we  use  a  slightly 
modified  sample.  In  practice,  some  individuals  are  observed  to  switch  more  than 
once. To simplify the analysis, we truncate each individual’s observations after their 
first observed switch. 
 
Table 7. Estimation results for linear probability model 
Dependent variable : whether individual does unpaid overtime (0/1) 
  Employees in the non-profit 
caring sector 
Employees in the for-profit 
caring sector 
Switch to for-profit caring  -0.132*  -0.114**       
  (0.075)  (0.058)     
Switch to non-profit caring      0.078  0.039 
      (0.089)  (0.069) 
Switch to non-caring  -0.141***  -0.064  -0.053  0.025 
  (0.052)  (0.044)  (0.076)  (0.068) 
Control variables  No  Yes  No  Yes 
N  3134  517 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level 
*** indicates significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level 
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These results provide some evidence of differential selection. All the coefficients have 
the expected sign. However, the only differences that are statistically significant are 
between people who stay in the non-profit sector and those who switch out, who are 
less likely to do unpaid overtime than the stayers. While the coefficient on the for-
profit  caring  dummy  in  the  non-profit  caring  sector  regression  is  positive,  it  is 
insignificant and the magnitude is reduced when the control variables are included. 
However, there is a much smaller sample of people working in the for-profit caring 
sector.  
 
7. Discussion and conclusions 
Our results provide the first clear evidence of a strong link between institution and 
pro-social behaviour in the form of donated labour in the provision of caring services. 
Consistent with a number of theories, we have shown that individuals in the non-
profit sector are significantly more likely to donate their labour than those in the for-
profit sector, and we have ruled out that this result is simply attributable to sector 
norms  or  implicit  contracts.  Our  results  also  rule  out  a  strong  version  of  the 
organisational form model with homogeneous agents, since this would imply that all 
individuals  who  switched  sector  would  change  their  behaviour  and  there  is  no 
evidence to support this.  
We have provided some evidence that individuals differentially select into the two 
sectors on the basis of their propensity to donate labour. An extreme version of the 
selection story would imply that all the difference in donated labour between the two 
sectors  is  attributable  to  selection,  with  no  role  for  the  kind  of  organisational 
incentives described by Francois (2000). Our results do not prove this strong selection 
story. An alternative explanation that we cannot rule out (since it is observationally 
equivalent to the pure selection story) is that organisational incentives matter to some 
people who are not among the switchers. This can be represented by including an 
additional sector-specific effect 
s
i y  in the individual error term, i.e. 
s
it i i it u v h y = + +  
While we find some evidence to support a selection story, we cannot rule out that a 
change in sector might affect behaviour for some people. Also, while our evidence 
supports a story of selection or mission-matching, organisational incentives may play   25 
an important role in creating and supporting missions. These remain important areas 
for further work.  
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Appendix A: Summary statistics 
































































































































































































































































































































Sample size  24135  3573  651  3219  16692 
Standard deviations in brackets 
Non-profit refers to not-for-profit organisations and public organisations; For-profit refers to private firms 
Caring refers to health, education and social care; Non-caring refers to all other industries   28 
Appendix B: Measurement error, misclassification of for-profit and 
non-profit sectors 
As the for-profit and non-profit sector allocations come from self-reported answers to 
the question as outlined in section 3, there could be misreporting or misrecording 
error. If this is the case then we could potentially observe a reported but not real 
switch in sector, which will especially affect the fixed effects panel data estimates, as 
these are identified solely from people that switch sector. 
If we consider a simple 2-period 2-sector model, then the fixed effects estimate for the 
non-profit premium in unpaid overtime in a model without other covariates is given 
by 
( ) ( )( )
01 01 10 10
1 0 1 0 ˆ 1 y y y y b l l = - + - -  
where the 0-sector is the for-profit sector and the 1-sector the non-profit sector. 
01
a y  is 
the proportion of people working unpaid overtime while employed in sector  { } 0,1 a =  
for those that in the first period worked in the for-profit sector and in the second 
period in the non-profit sector. Similarly for 
10
a y , for those who started in the non-
profit  sector  and  moved  to  the  for-profit  sector.  l   denotes  the  proportion 
( )
01 01 10 / n n n l = + . 
Different  misclassification  processes  will  lead  to  different  biases.  If  we  take  the 
results from the pooled regressions as an estimate of the true effect (although these 
estimates will also be downward biased through misrecording error) then we could 
observe the fixed effects results of no differences between sectors due to reporting 
error in the following circumstances. 
Misrecording error in one period only 
In this example, the sector in one period is misrecorded and the observed switches 
entirely spurious. We assume that unpaid overtime behaviour itself is not affected by   29 
the misrecording.
19 For ease of exposition we further assume that misrecording error 
only occurs in the first period. Individuals will on average do less unpaid overtime in 
the reporting period than the sector average if they misreport to be in the non-profit 
sector and vice versa. Let  0 d  denote the fraction that misreport to be in the for-profit 
sector in the first period and  1 d  the fraction that misreport to be in the non-profit 
sector in the first period. The effect estimate is then 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
01 01 01 01
0 11 01 0 11 00
10 10 10 10
1 11 01 1 11 00
ˆ 1
1 1
y y y y
y y y y
b l d d
l d d
= - + - -
+ - - + - -
 
where  now  e.g.  ab y   is  the  proportion  of  people  working  unpaid  overtime  when 
reporting to be in sector a and working in sector b. In this case  ˆ b  will be downward 
biased  with  the  bias  larger  with  increasing  proportions  of  misrecording.  If, 
0 1 d d d = = ,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
01 10 10 01
11 11 01 01 1 1 E y E y E y E y E y m = = = = =   and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
01 10 10 01
00 00 10 10 0 0 E y E y E y E y E y m = = = = = , then  ( ) ( )( ) 1 0 ˆ 1 E b d m m = - - . As 
an indication of the amount of misrecording error needed to obtain our results through 
measurement  error  alone,  consider  the  estimates  of  the  pooled  model  without 
covariates  as reported in Table 3, 0.174 (se 0.032) and those of that  of the fixed 
effects model, 0.000 (se 0.029). Using the 95% confidence intervals, we get for the 
smallest possible effect size ( ) 1 0 m m -  as estimated in the pooled model the value of 
0.111. The largest estimate for ( )( ) 1 0 1 d m m - -  in the fixed effects model is equal to 
0.057.  These  values  could  therefore  occur,  with  small  probability,  due  to 
measurement error if  0.49 d > . We ignored in this calculation the downward bias of 
the  pooled  estimator  itself  due  to  the  measurement  error.  Clearly,  the  zero  effect 
obtained in the fixed effects model is therefore very unlikely to result solely due to 
measurement error. 
 
                                                 
19 If people misreport because they truly belief that they work e.g. in the for-profit sector whereas they 
do work in a not-for-profit organisation, but learn the true status of their sector over time, then this 
should not affect the results as this would in effect be a genuine switch.   30 
Misrecording in both periods 
Misrecording in both periods refers to a respondent reporting to move for example 
from the non-profit sector to the for-profit sector whereas the opposite was the case. 
The estimator is then 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
01 01 01 01
0 10 01 0 11 00
10 10 10 10
1 10 01 1 11 00
ˆ 1
1 1
y y y y
y y y y
b l g g
l g g
= - + - -
+ - - + - -
 
where  0 g  is the proportion misrecording for-profit in the first period and non-profit in 
the second and  1 g  the proportion misrecording non-profit in the first period and for-
profit in the second. Clearly, the estimate for the treatment effect will again be biased 
downward.  If  0 1 g g g = = ,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
01 10 01 10
11 11 01 01 1 E y E y E y E y m = = = =   and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
01 10 01 10
00 00 10 10 0 E y E y E y E y m = = = =   then  ( ) ( )( ) 1 0 ˆ 1 2 E b g m m = - - .  Repeating 
the calculations above we would need  0.25 g >  for the estimates found to have a 
small probability to be due to measurement error only. 
Multiple Periods 
Of course, in the full panel various other (spurious) switches are possible. However, 
the main results obtained above remain. For example if the only switches observed in 
a three-year panel where of the sequence 0-1-0, then the fixed effect estimate would 
be equal to  ( ) 1, 2 0, 1 0, 3
1 ˆ
2
t t t y y y b = = = = - + . If a proportion d  of sector 1 in period 2 is 
reported with error, then, again, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0, 2 1, 2 0, 1 0, 3 1 0
1 ˆ 1 1 .
2
t t t t E E y y y y b d d d m m = = = =
  = + - - + = - -  
 
 
As mentioned in the text in section 5, the pattern of switches found in the data does 
not indicate this type of misrecording error, as most individuals stay in the new sector 
after switching. 